Abstract Different European nation-states use the most diverse statistical constructions of foreign origin or ethnic minority populations. Several countries traditionally even shun from producing such data. This makes international comparison a very difficult endeavour. Anyone wanting to perform comparative Int. Migration & Integration (2009) research on immigrants or (immigrant origin) ethnic minorities in Europe is unavoidably confronted with the most diverse types of national statistical data and has to opt for ad hoc solutions. Attempts at international comparison can thus be very tricky due to data characteristics. It is important that researchers are aware of these problems and do not simply accept data (especially in comparisons) at face value. In this article we embark on a comparative explorative study of the way in which immigrant background and immigration related ethnicity is taken stock of by national statistical institutes in a set of European nation-states.
Introduction
Counting and classifying inhabitants of foreign origin and/or identifying them as being part of ethnic minorities is often a sensitive issue. Categorization of certain social and ethnic groups when monitoring the population is an important tool in developing adequate policy, among other things to be able to tackle discrimination and unequal opportunities. Although often meant to improve the situation of those being counted, census material and statistical data have at repeated times, however, been misused to single out 'foreign' elements in order to contain, mistreat or even deport and-in the worst case scenario-to exterminate them (Seltzer and Anderson 2001) . As a result, discussions of the measurement of ethnicity or foreign background often provoke strong feelings.
Furthermore, although seemingly a technically neutral tool, statistics are often the product of a particular social and political context. In the context of ethnicity, they may reflect ad hoc dominant views on insider-outsider relations and thus become contested over time. Moreover, when used as a basis for affirmative action, specific demarcations can have important consequences for vested interests of particular groups.
There is no uniform European system for ethnic categorization. Different European nation-states use the most diverse statistical constructions of foreign origin or ethnic minority populations. Several countries traditionally even shun from producing such data. This makes international comparison a very difficult endeavour. Anyone wanting to perform comparative research on immigrants or (immigrant origin) ethnic minorities in Europe is unavoidably confronted with the most diverse types of national statistical data and has to opt for ad hoc solutions. Attempts at international comparison (of employment levels, educational attainment, political inclusion, etc.) can thus be very tricky due to data characteristics. It is important that researchers are aware of these problems and do not simply accept data (especially in comparisons) at face value.
In this article, we embark on a comparative explorative study of the way in which immigrant background 1 and immigration related ethnicity 2 is taken stock of by national statistical institutes in a set of European nation-states. We restrict the scope of the article to an exploratory study of the existence (and non existence) of official definitions and related operationalisations. We are mainly interested in looking at potential applications of statistical data on foreign origin and (immigration related) ethnic background for academic research. We will then reflect on the question what kind of data we would need in the future.
Different Traditions Across Europe
In all European states, the classification and counting of nationals and foreigners is regarded to be a legitimate endeavour. When examining migration and international mobility, nationality is often the most readily available criterion for distinction. In the member states of the European Union, the category of 'EU citizen' has recently become sort of an intermediary category in between the 'national citizen' on the one hand and the 'genuine foreigner' on the other hand (Jacobs and Rea 2005) . Indeed, in a growing number of policy matters the process of Europeanisation has lead to equal rights for residents from other EU member states, to which other foreigners are not necessarily entitled. As a result, in all kinds of official statistics increasingly the distinction is being made between 'EU citizens' on the one hand and 'third country nationals' (inhabitants who do not hold the nationality of one of the EU Member States) on the other hand. The latter are often presented as being more 'foreign' than the EU-citizens. Take for instance Italy which distinguishes foreigners as being either EU-citizens or "extracomunitari" (non-EU-citizens). Tellingly, the first law focusing on working conditions of immigrants referred to extracomunitari to pinpoint workers of non-EU nationality 3 , whereas the 1998 immigration law and its 2002 modification 4 identify 'foreigners' as citizens of states who are not members of the EU and stateless people. 1 When we refer to figures on immigrants in this paper, our focus is on nationals with an immigrant background and on foreigners with a legal residence status, but not on undocumented migrants. 2 There is a vast literature on the exact definition of the concept of ethnicity. As a reference point for the purpose of this article we want to refer to the definition used by Conference of European Statisticians for the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (2006) : "Ethnicity is based on a shared understanding of the history and territorial origins (regional, national) of an ethnic group or community as well as on particular cultural characteristics: language and/or religion and/or specific customs and ways of life" (UNECE 2006: 100) . The current paper wants to take a more limited view on ethnicity in focusing on the importance of (post World War II) migration as a source of ethnic diversity. Most countries in Europe lack an official (legal) definition of people of foreign origin or of ethnic minorities (of foreign origin). They only use the distinction between nationals and non-nationals (or 'foreigners'). As a side effect some forms of ethnic disadvantage and discrimination can often not be measured by making use of official population statistics since immigrants disappear as a specifically identifiable group once they have acquired state citizenship.
At first sight, the existence of uniform statistics on non-nationals does seem to offer some possibilities for comparative work between nation-states. The fact that all countries produce statistics distinguishing nationals and non-nationals within their population does, however, not guarantee us a reliable basis for international comparison. Nationality legislations apply conditions for nationality acquisition so differently, and the logics of ius sanguinis (blood links as the basis for nationality attribution) and of ius soli (residence as the basis for nationality attribution) in such varying manners, that one would be comparing apples and pears. It is much more likely for a person with a foreign background to have state citizenship in Belgium or The Netherlands than it is in Austria or Switzerland, to give but one example. This makes a correct comparison-for instance with regard to unemployment figures of immigrants-between these sets of countries very difficult. Across all EU member states important differences in the modes, requirements and procedures for the attribution and acquisition of citizenship persist (Cantisani and Greco 2006a) .
Counting nationals and non-nationals has nothing controversial and few critical questions are raised with regard to the growing importance of distinguishing EU-citizens and third country nationals. Counting and classifying individuals on the basis of their ethnic origin or even 'race' is, however, to a far lesser degree seen to be acceptable in (western) continental Europe, while it is a standard operating procedure in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Brasil. In the latter countries interethnic relations are judged to have as much importance and relevance as gender or class relations. Official statistics routinely distinguish races and this does not seem to provoke large scale criticism. Indeed, in recent years, the statistical construction of ethnic and racial groups in the US has mainly provoked a debate with the possible introduction of the category of a 'mixed race' in the 2000 Census (Amaro and Zambrana 2000; Krieger 2000; Lee 1993; Nobles 2000; Riche 1999; Sondik et al. 2000; Waters 2000; Williams and Jackson 2000) , without fundamentally questioning the whole racializing framework to start with (but see Kertzer and Arel 2002) .
In (Western) continental Europe, ethnic classifications often have no comparable institutional or statistical translation, although they are very currently being used in day to day life. One could argue in favour of such classifications as tools to measure ethnic and racial discrimination. Moreover, targeted groups might mobilise them in order to defend their interests in policies of redistribution of social goods (jobs, housing, etc.) . However, the possibility of using such categorizations to tackle discrimination apparently does not provide sufficient justification for the construction of ethnic categories in official statistics. The misfit between the vastness of the debate, particularly in France, which is triggered by the mere possibility of constructing ethnic categories in statistics (see for an overview: Spire and Merllié 1998; Blum 2002) on the one hand and the limited number of studies pertaining to the actual possibilities of operationalization of ethnicity on the other hand (Bulmer 1996; Simon 1997 Simon , 1998 Aspinall 2002; Lie 2002) attests to the strong political dimension of the matter. The political passions which feed the scientific debate strongly demonstrate that the definition of statistical categories on ethnicity and race is not merely a technical matter. The construction of these categories is influenced by ideologies, visions about nations and visions about interrelations between social groups. An additional element which further complicates the debate is that they are also performative: the use of ethnic categories reinforces the ethnicization and racialization of society. Once they are socially constructed, these categories gain their own life.
Although this is a rather crude classification and Central and Eastern European countries do not really fit straightforwardly into the picture, one can schematically distinguish two traditions related to 'ethnic statistics' in Europe. 5 In France and most Southern European countries, the dominant statistical categorizations merely distinguish individuals on the basis of their nationality. It basically boils down to a limitation to two categories: the national and the foreigner. Often an additional distinction is made among the foreign population between those coming from other EU-member states and those who do not. With the introduction of the category 'immigrant population'-including all people born as a foreigner abroad (i.e. all people who were foreigners at the moment of birth, regardless of their current nationality status)-France has, nevertheless, tried to make the demographic contribution of immigration to its population a bit more visible without, however, distinguishing ethnic groups.
In contrast, most northern European countries have been producing data on the ethnic and/or foreign origin of their populations in a more detailed manner, albeit using different techniques. The UK has for instance a system of self-identification of ethnicity. Norway, in contrast, keeps track since 1994 of its 'immigrant population' by counting the number of persons who neither have parents nor grandparents born in Norway (Vassenden 2005) . National background is kept track of by looking at the person's own, their mother's or possibly their father's country of birth. Separate statistics are produced for different regions of origin.
6 Although in strict legal terms 'foreigners' are non-nationals, Denmark also uses the term 'foreigners' (Udlaendinge) as a statistical concept, regardless of citizenship, to refer to immigrants (people born outside of the country whose parents are either foreign citizens or both were born outside of Denmark) and descendants (people born in Denmark by parents whom neither of which is Danish citizen born in Denmark). Specific numbers are produced for 'lesser developed nations' (countries outside of Scandinavia, the EU and North America). 7 Similarly, Sweden uses country of birth registration along with data on parents, which enables the identification of exact nationalities and of foreign background (utländsk bakgrund). As a result of a vivid debate on who was to be classified as an "immigrant" 5 Simon (2007) tentatively distinguishes three traditions: a "state-centred type" one (EU-15 except the northern European countries) in which country of birth and citizenship variables are collected; a "mosaic type" in which variables on nationality/ethnicity and language are collected (Baltic countries, central and eastern Europe, Balkans) and a "post-migration multicultural type" (UK, Ireland, Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries) in which info on ethnic group, religion and/or parents' country of birth is gathered. Since our interest is focused on (post World War II) migration related ethnic diversity, we prefer to limit our attention to the "state-centred type" and the "post-migration multicultural type". 6 For instance Nordic countries, Non-western countries (Asia including Turkey, Africa, South and Central America and Eastern Europe) and Third world countries (Asia including Turkey, Africa, South and Central America). (invandrare), the definition of the latter was changed in the late 1990s. It used to be enough to have one foreign-born parent to be classified into the foreign background category; now only those born in Sweden having two foreign-born parents get this classification. It is however still possible for researchers to chose their own classification as detailed country of birth data is available at-and can be aggregated from-the individual level. 8 The Dutch equally try to count their population of foreign origin (regardless whether they hold Dutch nationality or not) since 1995 on the basis of country of birth of the parents of its residents. The Dutch have adopted the category of "allochthones" to label the ethnic or foreign origin of segments of its population and can make distinctions with regard to countries of origin.
Interestingly, Belgium is caught somewhere in between these two traditions (Jacobs and Rea 2005) and finds itself in a stalemate position. The French speaking part of Belgium tends to follow the French tradition of refusing ethnic categorization, while the Flemish (the Dutch speaking part) try to copy the Dutch model in distinguishing "allochthones" and "autochthones". In Flanders, as in The Netherlands, the term "allochthone" is widely used in academic, political and institutional circles to refer to immigrant (mainly non-EU origin) inhabitants. This difference in conceptualization within one and the same state has, however, not led the federal Belgian state-which is still in charge of population statistics-to produce any official data on the number of "allochthones" on the national level. Federal law stipulates that the national statistical office, l'Institut National de Statistique (INS), does not have the authorisation to produce any statistics relating to ethnic origin:
"In no case whatsoever can the investigations and statistical studies of the national institute for statistics be related to the private life, the political, philosophical or religious opinions or activities, race or ethnic origin" Institut National De Statistique (1986).
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The INS seems to follow this guideline in a strict manner and thus refrains from producing statistics on place of birth of parents and grandparents (one of the criteria of the Flemish definition of "allochthone"). The result is that the Flemish administration has a detailed definition of "allochtones" but does, at the same time, not have the appropriate instruments to count how many there are (Jacobs and Rea 2005) .
European Efforts Towards Harmonisation of Statistics
Is the deadlock situation in Belgium predictive of the way in which the issue will be handled on the European level? If Belgium up until now has failed to find a compromise between the two traditions in the matter, will Europe do better? The European commission indeed hopes it will be able to push EU member states in the direction of a uniform statistical apparatus for counting immigrants by going beyond the criterion of nationality.
The Commission has recently (July 2007) adopted a regulation on community statistics on migration, attempting to harmonize data collection on this topic (COM 2005, 375 final) . 10 The regulation pushes the member states to produce annual statistics disaggregating the population according to country of birth.
11 It equally calls for (annual) statistics on the number of persons acquiring citizenship and formerly holding citizenship of another state (or being stateless). This does indeed already constitute an important step forward in facilitating transnational comparison.
There are, however, still quite some technical issues to be resolved. Coverage of data on nationality acquisition currently varies significantly across countries-some counting all changes in nationality, others limiting themselves to certain procedures.
12 Tailoring will be necessary to allow for genuine comparability (Cantisani and Greco 2006b) . Even if technical matters are sorted out, the produced figures will still not be completely satisfactory for all research purposes (Cantisani and Poulain 2006) .
One of the fundamental problems will be that new acquisitions of citizenship can be counted but that the exact magnitude of the existing stock of foreign origin citizens will remain unknown if this kind of data is not available for earlier periods.
13 The so-called second and third generations, an intensively studied group in social sciences and the focus of quite some political debate and policy making, will furthermore still remain out of sight since they were born in the country to which their parents or grandparents migrated. Moreover, in a number of countries (Belgium, France, Spain, The Netherlands, Germany, Ireland, Portugal and the UK) they have been attributed citizenship at birth, according to the place of birth of the parents or certain residence requirements (Cantisani and Greco 2006a: 174) and, thus, will not be made visible in statistics on acquisition of citizenship. A classification based on country of birth of parents or self-identification, which would be able to resolve this problem, is not proposed in the Regulation.
The Dutch notion of "allochtone" (based on country of birth of parents) does allow to pinpoint this segment of the population. The question should, however, be raised to what extent that logic should be extended to the level of grandparentswhich the Dutch are increasingly doing. Perhaps even more importantly, the issue 11 Preceding the drafting of the regulation, annual information on country of birth (combined with age and sex) was not available for the following EU member states: Czech republic, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Cyprus, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Hungary, Malta, Poland and Portugal Poulain 2006: 200-2001) . 12 Tricky issues are (a) incomplete registration mechanisms for semi-automatic types of acquisition and (b) inclusion (or exclusion) of atypical forms of acquisition (for instance naturalisation of people living abroad, acquisition through adoption, reacquisitions of citizenship by former citizens, etc.) (Cantisani and Greco 2006b; Perrin 2006) . 13 In cases where the stock cannot be determined using information of population registers, an alternative ad hoc solution might be provided by a cohort approach using retrospective data from the census (Perrin 2006). should be resolved what to do with the 'offspring' of mixed couples in your classification system. Some would argue a self-identification system is better, as it exists in the UK. Such a system is, however, equally not devoid of problems and pitfalls. Decisions have to be made on the categories among which respondents can choose (unless one opts for an open question). Members of visible minorities can furthermore deliberately choose to classify themselves as being part of the majority group. This would then, of course, be their legitimate choice but would at the same time frustrate correct analysis of discriminatory practices against so-called visible minorities.
Comparing the situation of immigrant origin (ethnic minority) groups in different European countries might in our view profit from using data which does not remain limited to the current citizenship status of inhabitants. If all national institutes of statistics would gather data-and make them available-on indicators such as nationality at birth, place of birth, nationality of the parents, place of birth of the parents or nationality at birth of the parents, this would open up possibilities for comparisons which are not (or at least less) blurred by differences in nationality legislations.
Most European countries today, however, do generally not possess a lot of readily available data on these 'alternative' indicators. Moreover, when state administrations do collect this kind of data, they are often not publicly accessible for research purposes and often not even available to the national statistical offices. Some countries have annual data, others only have (ten yearly) census data. Particular data might be collected for administrative purposes but this does not guarantee that they are available for statistical analysis-let alone that they would allow for international comparative work. Let us just address the situation in a selected number of countries to clarify this point.
In Germany, the national institute of statistics (Bundesambt für Statistik) has only data based on current nationality (annual data) and place of birth (census data). Switzerland has information on current nationality, nationality at birth and place of birth.
14 Information on nationality of the parents is present for children born out of wedlock and for offspring of mixed couples (in order to be able to apply particular regulations on ius sanguinis). In Spain current nationality and place of birth are equally available. Data on nationality of the parents and place of birth of the parents is only available for individuals who (still) live in the same household as their parents. In Portugal the National Statistics Institute basically only has information on current nationality (annual data), although the Census equally delivers information on the place of birth. In Italy information is available on current citizenship (annual data) and place of birth (census). Information on citizenship at birth is limited to data deduced from the question whether one had Italian citizenship at birth or not (through a Census question). Technically speaking, data on nationality of the parents is available for people who were born and resident in Italy. Belgium, to give a last example, is technically capable of tracking place of birth, nationality of parents and place of birth of parents in its detailed Population Register but due to legal obstacles the National Institute for Statistics can only present information on current nationality. The National Institute for Statistics has data on nationality at birth for the 1991 Census but no longer for the 2001 Census (when that question was struck). Table 1 provides an overview of available annual statistics in the (pre 2007) 25 EU member-states plus Norway and Switzerland. All countries have Census information on citizenship and country of birth, 15 but not all countries can provide annual data. It should equally be stressed that the methods used to produce annual statistics are quite diverse. Some countries rely directly on population registers (Belgium, Denmark, Latvia, Finland, Sweden, The Netherlands, Spain, Austria, Norway), while other countries make estimates (mostly based on Census data and other information; Cantisani and Poulain 2006) .
As a result of all this divergence in available data, international comparisons are doomed to stick to the lowest common denominator, which is in practice often the As we have stated before, some countries in the EU have tried to conceptually classify their population according to (pseudo-) ethnic criteria by clearly moving beyond the simple distinction between nationals and foreigners and going further than country of birth. In the remainder of this article we will discuss the (proto-) typical cases of The Netherlands (which has a similar approach as the Nordic countries) and the UK in more detail. We will first, however, take a closer look at the notion of 'ethnic minorities'.
The Notion of 'National Minorities' and 'Ethnic Minorities'
Most countries lack a clear definition (and operationalization) of ethnic minorities. If public authorities do use the notion of minorities it is often focused upon so-called national minorities, in most cases historical linguistic minorities, in line with the Framework convention on the protection of national minorities of the Council of Europe. In the EU only France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Greece have not signed or ratified this convention.
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The Baltic states have a particular statistical interest in keeping track of the ethnic composition of their populations. Estonia talks about "ethnic nationality" in this context and distinguishes the following groups: Estonian, Russian, Byelorussian, Finnish, Tatar, Latvian, Polish, Jewish, Lithuanian, German and other ethnic nationalities. The data on "ethnic nationalities" comes from the Census in which people are asked to self classify themselves. Parents determine the ethnic nationality of their children. If the child's mother and father were of different "ethnic nationalities" and the parents cannot agree on the ethnic nationality of their child, the ethnic nationality of the mother is preferred. Lithuania distinguishes as 'ethnicities' Lithuanian, Russian, Polish, Belarussian, Ukrainian, Jewish, Latvian, Tatar, German, Romany and Other. The Baltic States are somewhat particular in this respect and their stance should be interpreted in the light of difficulties in dealing politically with (in particular) its Russophone minorities after independency from the Soviet Union. It is clear ethnic minorities in the context of the Baltic States does not refer to 'classic' immigrant origin populations; some would indeed argue that Baltic Russians did not really migrate but that a modification in state borders suddenly made them 'outsiders'.
Other former communist central and eastern European countries (such as Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia among the EU countries) equally have a tradition in monitoring the presence of 'national minorities' and 'language groups' through open or multiple choice Census questions. These data collection efforts did not originate out of a desire to track recent migration related ethnic diversity-in contrast to the situation in north-western European countries-but are rather aimed at keeping track of historical linguistic and diasporic ethnic minority groups. In the remainder of this article we wish to focus our attention on statistical efforts in keeping track of (recent) migration related ethnic diversity. As prototypical examples for this kind of measurement of "ethnic minorities", we will focus on the UK and The Netherlands.
Although the term "ethnic minority" is widely used both in official policy and in public discourse in the UK, it is not a recognized legal term. Instead, the UK Government defines a national ethnic minority as a "racial group", under the Race Relations Act 1976. A "racial group" is a group of people defined by race, colour, nationality and ethnic or national origins, and the Race Relations Act 1976 protects all racial groups from unlawful discrimination. The courts have explicitly recognized Romany Gypsies, Irish Travellers, Jews and Sikhs as constituting racial groups for the purposes of the RRA 1976 legislation. A more precise definition of "racial group", based on ethnic origins, was given by the House of Lords. 17 In 1983, the House of Lords emphasized that the word "ethnic" should be interpreted "relatively widely, in a broad, cultural/historic sense", but also observed that "the word 'ethnic' still retains a racial flavour". Tribunals and courts have ruled on the basis of this that the English, Scots and Welsh, among others, are not racial groups by virtue of distinct "ethnic origins". As we shall discuss in the specific section on the UK, "white" is considered to be a separate ethnic category.
One country, The Netherlands, does have a strong tradition of using the term of 'ethnic minority' in public policy discourse to refer to immigrant origin populations without using an explicit racial discourse. In 1983, the Dutch government launched a so-called minorities policy explicitly aimed at emancipation of officially defined categories of ethnic minorities, with the objective of elevating the 'ethnicized' groups to equal social status with the indigenous groups in Dutch society, while at the same time propagating the ideal of a multicultural society. In the original Dutch governmental discourse it was stipulated that the ethnic minorities policy limited itself to those immigrants "for whom the presence is seen by the authorities as being their special responsibility (due to the colonial past or because they have been recruited by the authorities) and who find themselves in a minority situation" (Minderhedennota 1983: 12) . The minorities policy thus concerns on the one hand the Surinamese, Antilleans, Arubans and Moluccans (and their offspring) and, on the other hand, the Moroccans, Turks and other guestworkers from the Mediterranean area (Italians, Spanish, Greeks and (ex-)Yugoslaves) and their offspring. A foreign origin group is only considered to be an ethnic minority group if one judges that the group is structurally trapped in a disadvantageous socioeconomic position. As a result, gypsies and asylum seekers have equally become to be considered as part of the ethnic minorities, but other groups as foreigners coming from neighbouring countries (Belgium and Germany) have not been defined as such. It is interesting to note that the Chinese have for a long time equally not been recognized as being an ethnic minority (as a policy category). In sum, the category of ethnic minority was defined in a way cumulating both the social situation as criteria of foreignness.
The Notion of 'Allochthones' in The Netherlands
Although the central terminology is still 'ethnic minorities' in policies targeted at foreign origin groups the category of "allochthones" has in the meantime gained importance through extensive use. The notion was introduced in the policy domain by the report Allochtonenbeleid (WRR 1989) of the academic advisory body for the government (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor Regeringsbeleid, in short: WRR). In this document "allochthones" were defined as:
"Allochthones are, generally speaking, all persons who come from elsewhere and have durably settled in The Netherlands, including their descendants until the third generation, in as far as the latter want to consider themselves as allochthones. Minorities are allochthonous groups which find themselves in a disfavoured position: it has to be assessed periodically which groups have to be considered to be minorities" (WRR 1989: 10) .
It was also in this report that a plea was held to install a system of ethnic registration which goes further than the distinction between nationals and nonnationals. The report preferred a system of self-registration. In its reaction to the report, the Dutch government, however, stated it preferred to stick to the notion of ethnic minorities and it did not go into the matter of ethnic registration. Although the notion of "allochthone" was starting to be routinely used in policy documents, it only got an operational basis in 1995, following the introduction of a new population administration system at the municipal level (Gemeentelijke Basisadministratie (GBA)). It was the national statistical office, the Central Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS), which de facto defined and constructed the new category of "allochthone" in a semi autonomous manner, using information coming from the GBA.
It is the definition of the national statistical office which would become hegemonic and is still the reference today. Since 1999 the CBS defines allochthones as:
"every person living in The Netherlands of which at least one of the parents was born abroad" Note that the definition does not in itself suggest any racial or cultural connotation, 18 the criterion is place of birth of the parents. Place of birth of the parents is used as a proxy for foreign origin. It is 'imprecise' as an ethnic category in the sense that it for instance equally includes children of Dutch expatriates.
Before 1999, the CBS already used the category of "allochthone": the allochthonous population was systematically counted on the basis of municipal data since 1995.
19 However, during the period 1995-1999, there were two definitions in use: an enlarged one and a restricted one. According to the enlarged definition, the allochthones were all persons who lived in The Netherlands and were either not born in The Netherlands or were born in The Netherlands but had at least one parent which was not born in The Netherlands. In a more limited definition, the CBS only took account of people born abroad of whom at least one parent was equally born abroad and of people who were born in The Netherlands but who had two parents born abroad. In the year 1998, the CBS had the habit of privileging the restricted definition in its publications. Due to insistence by the government, the CBS in 1999, however, once again preferred to use the enlarged definition before finally opting for the new definition which is still in use in 2009.
The most recent definition of "allochthones" thus entails all people of the restricted definition, while adding all persons born in The Netherlands of whom at least one parent was not born in The Netherlands. The difference with the older enlarged definition is that it no longer includes people who were born abroad out of two parents born in The Netherlands. In the 1999 annual report regarding the minorities policy, the government stipulated it preferred to keep the children from "mixed" couples in the new definition (as opposed to the old restricted definition). The (odd) argumentation was as follows:
"The mixed group is interesting because they seem to succeed better than the group of whom the two parents are born abroad".
20
Following the operationalization by the national statistics office, the category of "allochthone" was increasingly used in policy documents, academia, public debate and the media. As a result, it was eventually even adopted in ordinary language. Not surprisingly, in the process the notion of "allochthone" underwent a change of meaning and became increasingly used in ways differing substantially from its original administrative definition. It began to be widely used to pinpoint people of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean origin-the largest official "ethnic minorities"-and for refugees from Africa, Asia and Latin America. It was gradually bestowed with a connotation of the "non-white non-European other". Originally constructed as a mere descriptive statistical category by CBS, the diffusion of the term in ordinary speech acts led to a transformation into a racial-culturalist category. It was now targeted toward everyone who was supposed not to have a "western" origin. European immigrants and their offspring tended not to be included in the semantic field of the notion, in contrast to its official definition.
The pressure towards a racializing content was reflected in the statistical distinction which the CBS itself introduced in 1999 when distinguishing western allochthones and non-western allochthones. 21 This distinction is mainly used for statistical purposes in the field of education (given the established fact that nonwestern allochthones on average do worse than western allochthones), although it has not remained limited to that policy domain.
Are part of the category of western allochthones according to the CBS: "the allochthones of European origin (with the exception of Turkey), of North-American origin, of Oceanic origin, of Indonesian origin and of Japanese origin". Are part of the category of non-western allochthones according to the CBS: "people originating from Turkish, African, Latin-American and Asian immigration, except for people of Japanese and Indonesian origin". The subdivision within the generic category of 20 Our translation. Second Chamber, 1999-2000, document 26815, p.5, note 2. 21 Since 1999, statistical data on this distinction were produced, starting with data for the year 1996. allochthones has thus more than an ethnic dimension. In the words of the national statistics office CBS, the Japanese and Indonesians have to be excluded from the category of non-western allochthones because of "their socioeconomic and cultural position" (http://statline.cbs.nl). The classification, thus, links up with two ideal typical contents of the 'immigrant' in popular discourse: ethnic origin and inferior social origin (Jacobs and Rea 2005) . We can note that people of Indonesian origin are excluded from the category since a lot of (descendants of) Dutch colonisers 'returned' to Europe after the independence of Indonesia. In the definition of nonwestern allochthones, the 'impreciseness' of the proxy of country of birth of parents was thus 'corrected' for a particular group of colonial expatriates (while at the same time introducing a new bias with regard to people of Indonesian origin without a genealogical link with white Dutch colonisers).
The third generation of foreign origin is automatically considered to be 'autochthonous' by the definition of the CBS. The category of "allochthone" hence does not function as an eternal racial category. Nevertheless, in ordinary life this limitation of the definition of "allochthone" is not as strictly respected. Interestingly, although the CBS scrupulously avoids to use the term "allochthone" to designate the third generation, the national statistical office has tried to keep track of this third generation. Indeed, since 2000 the CBS offers figures related to the "non-western third generation", in which it classifies everyone who has at least one grandparent who was born abroad in a 'non-western' country (following the earlier distinction between 'western' and 'non-western'). The data is produced in quite some detail, allowing to distinguish those who have respectively, one, two, three or all four grandparents of non-western origin. Specific data is provided for groups of Moroccan, Turkish, Surinamese and Antillean origin. It should be noted that comparable figures are not made available for the "western third generation".
A number of problems are evident when one uses the country of birth of parents or grandparents as a proxy for foreign origin or ethnicity. How many generations (two, three?) based on ascendance can and should one continue to distinguish? What rule should be applied to classify people with mixed origins in one or the other category? What is the precise justification for making culturalist distinctions between western and non-western groups? Not to mention the fact that quite some people classified as being 'allochthones' (in The Netherlands), 'immigrants' (in Norway) or even 'foreigners' (in Denmark), regardless of their citizenship status, do not like this at all. One way out would be to allow people to classify themselves as is done in the UK.
Self-identification of Ethnicity in the UK
In the UK, the main criterion used when producing statistics on ethnicity is ethnic group, although the Office of National Statistics (ONS) also collects data on place of birth 22 (and religion 23 ) through the 10-yearly Census (and in the major household 22 There is also some information available on the place of birth of the parents. Though not collected by the census, data has been collected via the British Register (for England and Wales since 1970) and by the General Household Survey. 23 A question on religion was present in the 2001 Census.
surveys). For England and Wales, statistics on ethnicity are collected and reported by the Office of National Statistics, using Census data (from 1991 onwards, when a question on ethnicity was first included in the Census), and also on the following specific areas by key government departments: housing (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister), the labour market (Department for Work and Pensions), health (Department of Health), education (Department for Education and Skills) and criminal justice and citizenship (Home Office). Statistics on ethnicity are collected separately for Scotland, where this is the responsibility of the Scottish Executive, and for Northern Ireland, where they are published by the governmental Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency. Unlike in most EU countries, citizenship and nationality data are not recorded in UK Censuses. The UK does furthermore not have a single population register nor a linked system of administrative sources that allows precise measurement of where people are in the country between censuses. The approach of using nationality as the principal criterion has not been taken in UK, since firstly, from a UK-policy perspective migrants do not cease to be minorities once they have taken British citizenship, and secondly, the nationality laws associated with Britain's former colonies are deemed too complex for nationality to be a useful variable on its own.
The The ethnic classification question is in other words a self-classification system but one in which one has to choose among pre-established categories. Of course, these pre-established categories-just as the wording of the question-can provoke criticism. Tellingly, the ethnic classification question for Scotland was under review by the Scottish Executive in 2005, since there was concern about the categories that were used in the 1991 and 2001 Censuses to classify the population along ethnic lines, and ministers sought to establish categories that were acceptable both to data providers and data users. Questions were piloted in 2006 and a broad consultation with stakeholders was organized. In July 2008 a new official ethnicity classification was determined and a set of recommendations were formulated in view of the 2011 Census (Scottish Government 2008) . 25 The new Scottish classification is as follows:
'What is your ethnic group? Choose ONE section from A to E, then tick ONE box which best describes your ethnic group or background. Without going into a detailed discussion of this new Scottish classification, let us just note that it reflects a number of concerns resulting from Scottish nationalist sensitivities and that it is made possible by the process of devolution. Indeed, the urge was felt to explicitly mention the possibility of a 'Scottish' national identity, to offer it as the first answering category for those self-identifying as 'white' and to include it as a hyphenated identity for non-white groups.
National Statistics of the UK acknowledged that collecting data on ethnicity is difficult because of the subjective, multi-faceted and changing nature of ethnic identification and the lack of consensus on what is an 'ethnic group': "Membership of any ethnic group is something that is subjectively meaningful to the person concerned and the terminology used to describe ethnic groups has changed over time. As a result, ethnic groups, however defined and measured, will tend to evolve depending upon social and political attitudes or developments. Therefore we do not believe that basing ethnic identification upon an objective and rigid classification of ethnic groups is practicable" (National Statistics 2003: 7) . This might be true, but the self identification in the UK system does imply a choice between pre-established categories. These pre-established categories are piloted and pre-tested, but it does in the end boil down to a forced choice and the offered categories do still largely reflect the dominant discourse (and legislative framework) of the state. Furthermore, there is the particular difficulty of self identification for people with mixed ascendance (although the 'mixed' option, which was introduced in the 2001 Census, does provide some kind of a solution to this problem).
Conclusion and Debate
Data on immigrants and ethnic minorities of different European countries are today hardly comparable. A number of countries can produce very detailed distinctions with regard to the foreign origin and composition of their population, while other countries feel the production of such data is inappropriate and dangerous. As a result, we have data on apples and pears and proper comparative social scientific work is being frustrated. If we want to do serious (quantitative) comparative work with regard to foreign origin groups across Europe, we need comparable operationalization systems which go beyond the simple distinction between nationals and non-nationals. The latter system is biased given the important variation in nationality legislations across Europe. The Regulation on harmonized statistics proposed by the European Commission is a step forward but does not resolve the issue of identifying and quantifying second generation immigrants and longer established ethnic minority groups.
In The Netherlands and Nordic countries, a formalized criterion (birth place of parents) has been introduced in the 1990s to pinpoint ethnic minority and foreign origin groups. It has proven to be a useful instrument in documenting discriminatory practices and social exclusion of ethnic groups. At the same time, however, the differentiation between western allochthones or immigrants and non-western allochthones or immigrants, has added to the process of racialization of society. Even worse, in public discourse these statistical notions sometimes function as (dis) qualifying social categories. As a result, the categories have incited quite some resistance among those being classified against their will. One way out would be to allow people to classify themselves as is done in the UK.
From a methodological point of view there are equally problems. Country of birth of parents (or grandparents) can only function as a proxy for immigrant background and ethnicity for a limited time span, especially because people with mixed origins are difficult to classify in a coherent and sensible manner. Furthermore, there is no 'objectively' fixed transition point-like being of the third or firth generation of immigrants-between being part of an ethnic minority group and no longer being part of ethnic minority group. Self-identification shifts the burden of this problem to the people we want to classify. That does not entirely resolve a number of fundamental challenges. People might legitimately want to classify themselves as part of the dominant ethnic group or as part of no ethnic group at all but still be faced with discrimination (or ethnic disadvantage) if they are judged to be part of a visible minority or negatively racialised group. When we confront the ethnic selfcategorization questions with the theoretical framework on ethnic groups, we notice that these do not overlap; also opinions and behaviors of others are crucial in the formation of ethnic groups (Jenkins 1994 (Jenkins , 1997 . Furthermore, objective approaches, as well as self-categorization questions threaten to erase the necessary logical connection between categorization by others and disadvantageous treatment. A person is not discriminated because he or she is black, but because other people believe this person is black (Sabbagh and Morning 2004: 50) . Therefore, for conceptual as well as for policy reasons, it might be useful to let people classify themselves in the way they believe most other people perceive them. When ethnic group membership is operationalized in this manner, it comes close to the Canadian concept of visible minorities, in which visibility (in terms of skin color) has a central place.
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In the end, every system of ethnic categorization holds the risk of essentialism: it reifies ethnic groups. Furthermore, ethnic categorizations reflect (dominant) opinions about who is 'in' and who is 'out', which are embedded in a specific time and place. Scientific classifications, and their statistical formalization-even if informed by self classification-are not immune to this. They are equally subordinate to the societal context and power relations as other social products. We agree with Bourdieu when he writes:
"every science which pretends to propose criteria which are in the best way anchored in reality should not forget that it does not do anything else than registering a particular state of the struggle of classification, that is to say, a particular state of material and symbolic relations of power between those who have an interest in this or that particular way of classifying and who, just as itself, call upon scientific authority to establish in reality and in reason an arbitrary division which it hopes to impose" (CR6 1980: 66).
The double hermeneutics which are inherent to social scientific activity does not allow us to imagine the constitution of scientific categories which are truly autonomous. Products of a social and political context, they are not immutable.
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They can be redefined when the context changes or they can loose their relevance when they have been instrumentally used-for instance when being used more as means of declassification than as means of classification. Categories which want to distinguish social groups and individuals should thus be treated with prudence and large reservations.
Nevertheless, one should equally be able to name problems in order to resolve them and to identify particular groups in order to be able and study them. Simon has nicely formulated this dilemma with which researchers and policy-makers are confronted:
"(…) is it preferable to defend the invisibilisation of ethnic differences in the observational apparatus, while at the same time risking to allow hidden discriminatory practices to prosper, or should one construct categories which, by their simple existence, can potentially reinforce a stigmatising designation of particular populations?" (Simon 1997: 9) . 26 Although the concept is operationalized in a very different way by Statistics Canada; namely by means of a self-categorization question 27 This can be exemplified by the various manners in which self-classification questions in the US, UK and Canada are posed. Ethnicity, race, skin color, cultural background, ancestry and geographical areas or countries are used as operationalizations in various forms and in various combinations, across as well as within countries.
Social scientists (and policy-makers) need analytical categories that allow to count and classify people according to their foreign origin or ethnic background in order to be able to examine their integration into mainstream society. We need reliable data to measure racial discrimination or processes of social exclusion of which visible minorities are victim. General public support to such registration is rather high: In 2006, 75% of the EU25 population said to be in favour to providing information about their ethnic origin if that could help to combat discrimination in their country (Special Eurobarometer 263 2007: 169) . However, we should be conscious (and remain vigilant) with regard to the performative effects of ethnic categorizations, especially in their statistical form. As Keith puts it:
"empirical academic studies potentially reify minority presence through ascribed ethnicities that are monitored, counted, and measured in terms of demographic penetration of political systems, employment profiles, and attempts to promote equal opportunities. Such measurement may be pragmatically progressive and politically defensible but inevitably it highlights the 'border problems' of definitions of demographic fixity that reveal the absurdity of racial languages enshrined in politics of affirmative action and census monitoring" (Keith 2005: 258, 259 ).
The classification of ethnic groups in our view, however, constitutes a necessary evil in the construction of an efficient policy aiming at equal opportunities and in the struggle against racism. Furthermore, if we want to promote the quality of international comparative work on the issue, it is essential that classification systems of foreign origin and ethnic background are as similar as possible. For the time being this is not (often) the case. Researchers should bare this in mind and reflect on the consequences. Policy-makers want to know whether their immigrant integration policies are effective and in a European context increasingly seek to compare the outcomes of their policy choices to those of other national models (for instance assimilationism versus multiculturalism). Academics are urged to provide answers on questions like what the best model for immigrant inclusion might look like and some colleagues (Koopmans 2008 ) are trying to do so even though they have to rely on limited amounts of genuinely comparable data. Immigrant integration policy is high on the political agenda of quite a number of European Union member states.
The debate on what the best immigrant inclusion policy might be is at the political center stage in several countries. The media and policy makers expect that academics working in the field of ethnic and migration studies help and come up with some reliable analyses on which these evaluations can be based. Even in perfect circumstances this is a risky business, but a lack of qualified comparable data to base claims on, makes things even worse.
We cannot propose a 'perfect' system for classification here. We do, however, think that comparative research will profit from the availability of reliable data on country of birth of parents of the population across Europe to be able to investigate recent immigrant groups of first and second generation. Possibly, a two speed Europe could develop, in which those countries that today already have a good registration system, agree on some basic definitions so that at least these countries produce comparable data in a short time frame. Later, other countries may adjust their definitions and data collection methods. In the long term, and for those countries which have already long established ethnic minority groups, such a formalized classification system should in our opinion be combined with a self identification procedure. It is not a matter of one or the other system being better. For (comparative) research on immigrant origin groups and ethnic minority groups both strategies have their advantages and disadvantages. External classification (with proxies as country of birth of parents) is better suited for statistical comparative work on people linked to recent immigration waves. Self identification allows to (somewhat) remediate imposition effects and is better equipped to deal with 'historic' ethnic minority groups, but is more difficult to organise and more difficult to compare across countries.
